The rapid assault that expelled Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 has ignited a volatile political and military response throughout the nation.
An Al-Qaeda affiliate called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took control of Damascus, Israel expanded its hold over parts of southern Syria, and Turkey initiated new military actions aimed at the secular, multi-ethnic, Kurdish-led federation in Northern and Eastern Syria (NES). The U.S., which has had troops deployed there as part of their fight against ISIS, maintains a significant military presence in this region.
However, as things have calmed down, the U.S. has cut its troop numbers in Syria back to about 1000—the level they were at before December 2024—and more shifts are expected soon. The U.S. facilitated an agreement between the Kurdish-led/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is aligned with the U.S., and the newly established government in Damascus. This pact envisions a phased incorporation of the SDF into the evolving Syrian state and armed forces, all while safeguarding some self-governance rights for NES. These developments have unexpectedly raised prospects for enduring stability in Syria.
The deal arrives on the back of not only a détente between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the militant Kurdish group against which Ankara has long used as a pretext for airstrikes and ground invasions targeting the SDF in Syria and sometimes endangering U.S. troops, but also unprecedented talks between the Syrian Kurdish leadership and their rivals in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan.
These elements converge to form a distinctive chance. The U.S. has the option to transfer accountability to a joint operation involving Kurdish forces, Syrians, and regional entities against ISIS, all while sustaining its current endeavors to back a diplomatic solution to the ongoing 14-year-long Syrian crisis remotely—enabling a controlled reduction in the number of American soldiers stationed there.
Both the U.S. armed forces and their Kurdish allies in Syria understand the situation is dire. At a recent event, event When evaluating the possibility of a U.S. exit from Iraq and Syria, former CENTCOM leader and persistent supporter of American military involvement in Syria, General Joseph Votel, admitted: "The Trump administration made it evident right after taking office that they do not envision the U.S. as deeply involved in Syria."
Back in 2019, President Trump ordered a shambolic and ultimately unsuccessful pullout of American forces from Syria, making room for a swift Turkish incursion. Many civilians lost their lives and hundreds of thousands were forced to leave their homes. By Turkey along with its Islamist militia allies until the directive was suddenly overturned. This no-win scenario kept the U.S. equally ensnared as before, all while enduring the embarrassment of disorder reminiscent of Joe Biden’s 2021 departure from Kabul.
The question is, therefore, can the U.S. actually accomplish a withdrawal while evading the unwanted optics of once again abandoning its erstwhile partners (the Kurds) to a potential slaughter by its adversaries, or worse, creating an even bigger mess that sucks Washington right back into the Syrian quagmire, like Iraq in 2014 Fortunately, this objective appears more attainable now than ever before, thanks to the surprising turn of events in Syria as of late.
The potential for increased disorder after Assad's downfall probably prevented Trump from taking immediate action—what General Votel referred to as a "degree of forbearance" during his initial 90 days in office, acknowledging that he couldn’t remove troops right away. For instance, this restraint was evident when Trump froze global U.S. aid in January 2025. urgent financing was quickly pushed through to Syria, allowing Kurdish-led forces to continue operating the camps and detention centers where they hold over 25,000 ISIS-affiliated detainees from over 50 countries).
But unlike in Afghanistan, the U.S. has a trusted, highly-trained partner force in Syria. The SDF commands some 100,000 troops — significantly more, indeed, than the leaders in Damascus. During my latest trip to NES, I had an audience with Rojhelat Afrini, who serves as the general commander of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), the entirely female Kurdish contingent instrumental in defeating ISIS. "Should ISIS be contained and assurances provided against Turkish assaults," stated Afrini, "we wouldn't require outside protection. We could manage our affairs independently, as Syrian citizens."
Actually, the current ISIS threat has been considerably reduced, as the terrorist group can no longer maintain territorial control, even after Assad’s potential departure from power. By now, the SDF is sufficiently prepared to handle the lingering ISIS insurgency.
When I queried General Votel about what steps the U.S. military could take to absorb the lessons from 2019 and react to an updated executive directive mandating a reduction in troops, he proposed focusing on safeguarding the ISIS prisoners first. He also recommended maintaining ongoing air reconnaissance and sharing intelligence with the SDF even post-exit. Furthermore, he advised conducting a meticulously planned drawdown characterized by transparent messaging both upwards through the command structure towards Washington and downwards to the SDF, ensuring they have ample notice regarding America’s departure strategy.
Certainly, there is a real danger presented by that corps of deeply radicalized ISIS prisoners, who won’t disappear quickly. Nonetheless, the U.S. has the ability to urge its partners to apply such pressure. follow Washington’s own lead when repatriating and prosecuting their own citizens who have ties to ISIS instead of leaving them free to cause destruction in Syria, as stated by President Donald Trump’s counterterrorism director earlier this year urged the UK If that fails, the U.S. can still encourage its allies to contribute more funds towards supporting the detention of their citizens by the SDF, aligning with Trump’s wider message to Europe.
Even with all the discussions about ISIS, America maintained a significant secondary role in Syria as a strategic base within a nation predominantly under the influence of Assad’s Iranian and Russian supporters. "The U.S. involvement in Syria serves their interests, not necessarily ours as Syrian people," explains Hassan Koçer, a high-ranking officer in NES' political division. However, Iran's capabilities have diminished across the area due to strikes from Israel targeting its affiliates after the October 2023 Hamas assaults and subsequent conflict in Gaza. This shift could lead to Assad being overthrown and might remove one reason justifying ongoing American presence in the country.
Actually, it is the second concern highlighted by Afrin—the menace presented by Turkey—that constitutes the genuine test for a viable U.S. exit strategy, as demonstrated in 2019. General Votel emphasized the necessity of sustained diplomatic initiatives to facilitate dialogue among the SDF, HTS, and Turkey similar to those being undertaken presently. halted Turkish hostilities , yet he stressed that such political activities do not necessarily require a tangible U.S. military presence. "These issues should be addressed through political means rather than militarily, and the [U.S.-headed] Coalition plays a part in making sure this message is conveyed," Koçer states, mirroring Votel’s remarks.
In the meantime, the newly established leaders in Damascus seem pragmatic in their willingness to steer clear of direct confrontation with the SDF. The U.S. could support this stance from a distance using non-military tactics like enhancing autonomy and security for the NES. existing catalog of provisions for easing sanctions on Syria. Ongoing Kurdish ‘unity talks’ The disagreements between traditionally rival progressive and conservative Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq should aid in easing Turkey’s stated worries about the SDF, particularly considering Turkey’s connections with the opposing faction.
Finally, Turkey’s proposed new anti-ISIS coalition With Iraq, Jordan, and the Syrian interim government potentially providing a platform for revamping the anti-ISIS strategy, these nations might be compelled to work alongside U.S.-trained Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish units as well as additional regional actors like Saudi Arabia would discourage further regional instability, while also helping pick up the slack against ISIS.
The U.S. can therefore draw lessons from the failed 2019 departure from Syria to create a practical and realistic strategy for exiting the country.
The story initially appeared on Responsible Statecraft. this story
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